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I. Introduction
Andr6 Nollkaemper's impressive essay, System Criminality in International
Law,I raises important questions about the role of-and the relationship between-
principles of international criminal law and principles of the law of state
responsibility in addressing conduct that violates some of our most deeply held
values. He has made a substantial contribution to our thinking about the legal
concepts that best apply in situations of mass atrocities or widespread human rights
abuses. In this short Comment, I seek not so much to address specific claims
Professor Nollkaemper has advanced, but rather to reflect on some of the general
issues that his provocative essay raises.
II. Why (System) Criminality?
Professor Nollkaemper's essay lays out, with great conceptual clarity, the
phenomenon of "system criminality." What I would like to consider in this
Comment is whether there are any compelling justifications-in either conceptual,
instrumental, or normative terms-for designating a system under which
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Stanford Law School.
1. Andr6 Nollkaemper, System Criminality in International Law: Can the Law of International
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widespread crimes occur as "criminal," as opposed to one subject to the normal
rules of state responsibility. In other words, I want to explore whether the idea of
system criminality does any useful work. In this regard, I make three claims about
the idea of system criminality in the international context. First, I suggest that in
the international system, there is no real conceptual justification for invoking the
concept of "criminality," as opposed to "responsibility," at least in the context of
the behavior of states. Second, I argue that the concept of system criminality is
unlikely to provide many advantages-in either instrumental or norm expression
terms-over the more traditional combination of individual criminal responsibility
rules for persons operating in conjunction with state responsibility rules for states.
In instrumental terms, the system criminality concept does not bring with it many
additional tools that would help us halt the underlying criminal behavior. As an
expressive matter, it may be doubtful whether the norms articulated by the
international community can supplant the norms prevailing with a country
characterized by system criminality. Third, I suggest that there may be affirmative
drawbacks, from an instrumental perspective, in applying the concept of system
criminality to entities such as states.
A. The conceptual basis?
Let me begin by asking why, as a conceptual matter, we would seek to
designate violations of international humanitarian law or other universal norms by
a state as "criminal," rather than as "mere" breaches of state responsibility. The
analogy between criminal and civil liability in the domestic context-at least in the
United States-is an interesting point of departure for thinking about this in the
international context. Under U.S. law, virtually any serious criminal act perpetrated
against a victim will also constitute a breach of a civil law obligation. The crime of
murder, for instance, is also the tort of wrongful death. The crime of rape is the tort
of assault. The crime of theft is the tort of conversion. Although the notion of
"crime"-as opposed to "tort"-traces its origins to the consolidation of the
modem state2 and theological concerns, 3 contemporary jurisprudence distinguishes
crime and from tort essentially on the basis of whose interest the application of the
2. CHARLES W. THOMAS & DONNA M. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW: UNDERSTANDING BASIC
PRINCIPLES 19 (1987) (describing the development of the state's interest in crime, which
supplanted a regime in which "[aill injuries seem to have been viewed as private, amenable
wrongs").
3. Id. at 41 (noting the historical connection "between the concepts of crime and sin" based
largely on the role of ecclesiastical courts).
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legal rule is meant to protect. In the case of a tort, the law serves to redress injury
suffered by the particular victim of an illegal act. In the case of a crime, in contrast,
the interests affirmed are not merely those of the victim, but more broadly the
state, or the entire community.4 In particular, criminalizing conduct and punishing
offenders serves a regulatory function and contributes instrumentally-at least in
theory-to public order through deterrence and the incapacitation and
rehabilitation of offenders. 5 Criminalizing conduct also serves the important public
function of expressing and affirming societal norms,6 in a way that the provision of
traditional private tort remedies to a victim does not.
In international law, traditional notions of state responsibility serve largely the
same function that civil law serves in the domestic context. To the extent
traditional legal norms involve reciprocal exchanges between states, the purpose of
the law of state responsibility is to provide redress for the "injured state" that has
been harmed by a breach. 7 If the United States, for example, imposes unlawful
tariffs on Japanese steel products, the international law of state responsibility
provides a mechanism by which Japan can demand cessation of the violation of its
rights and can seek reparation for the harm it has suffered. There is no justification
for applying the concept of criminality to such a breach-even though, of course, a
breach of this kind is as much the product of collective or systemic decision-
making and implementation by the government as would be the case with an ethnic
cleansing campaign entailing the commission of crimes against humanity.
The conduct with which Professor Nollkaemper's essay is concerned, however,
differs from traditional breaches of international law. To the extent these offenses
are erga omnes obligations, the international law of state responsibility already
serves the "public" functions that criminal law does in the domestic context. The
prohibitions on the perpetration of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity are intended not only to protect the interests of the particular victims of
4. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 15 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that "[t]he aim of
criminal law ... is to protect the public against harm," while the function of tort law is "to
compensate someone who is injured for the harm he has suffered").
5. Id. at 27-29 (discussing restraint, rehabilitation, and deterrence as theories underlying
criminal punishment).
6. Id. at 29 (describing the theory under which "criminal punishment serves, by the publicity
which attends the trial, conviction and punishment of criminals, to educated the public as to
the proper distinctions between good conduct and bad conduct-distinctions which, when
known, most of society will observe").
7. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, The
Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission, art. 42, at 294-95, 297,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (delimiting the concept of an "injured state" entitled "to invoke
the responsibility of another State" if an obligation owed to it is breached).
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those acts, but rather the interests of the international community as a whole. 8 As is
demonstrated by the kinds of collective measures Professor Nollkaemper identifies
in his paper as potential tools the international community may use to suppress
violations of these norms9-e.g., sanctions such as those imposed against the
apartheid regime in South Africa, the collective security responses of the kind that
have been authorized in the Cote d'Ivoire and the Sudan, and perhaps even
unilateral humanitarian intervention of the Kosovo variety-the international law
of state responsibility already has the potential to serve the public order and
governance functions that criminal law does in the domestic context. Additionally,
erga onmes norms prohibiting serious violations of international humanitarian
law-like domestic criminal sanctions-express the norms or values of the
international community.' ° Under the circumstances, the conceptual justification
for treating system criminality as criminal-and not "merely" a breach of state
responsibility-is unclear.
B. The instrumental benefits?
Let me now turn from the conceptual to the instrumental realm. Here, I suggest
that at least some of the regulatory tools aimed at suppressing illegal conduct that
might flow from the designation of conduct as "criminal" may not function well in
the context of system criminality. I again start by drawing some insights from the
domestic context about the regulatory role that criminal law can play , and then
highlight the limited utility of extending the concept of system criminality to the
international realm.
1. The domestic context
In the domestic law context-at least in the United States-addressing the
breach of a legal norm through the criminal sanction, as opposed to civil liability,
brings with it important instrumental advantages. The criminal sanction opens up a
more expansive tool kit for state officials who seek to fundamentally alter the
structure, or even the existence, of an entity that has committed "system"
8. Jonathan 1. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 459
(1999).
9. Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 335.
10. In the words of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, punishment for international crimes "should make plain the condemnation of
the international community of the behaviour in question" and should be seen as
"expressing the outrage of the international community at these crimes." Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, T 185 (Mar. 24, 2000).
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violations. This can be seen most clearly in the context of the criminal prosecution
of corporations for violations of the law. In recent years, the federal government
has become more aggressive in pursuing criminal indictments against corporations
for violations of the law. The use of the criminal justice mechanism
unquestionably provides the government with a broader range of remedial tools
than would ordinarily result through civil proceedings, where the normal remedy
for the breach of a legal norm would be the payment of money damages.
First in this regard, a criminal indictment against a corporation may result in the
dissolution of the firm in question. In 2002, for instance, Arthur Andersen, one of
the "Big Five" American accounting firms, was criminally prosecuted for
obstruction of justice in connection with the Enron scandal." After being
convicted, Arthur Andersen surrendered its licenses to practice as certified public
accountants,'2 which was essentially the "death penalty" for the firm.'3
Second, the presence or threat of criminal indictment of a corporation is often
used as leverage by the government to compel cooperation that will make it easier
to criminally prosecute the most culpable individual employees of the
corporation. 14
Third, the federal sentencing guidelines authorize a court to impose expansive
remedies against a corporation convicted of a crime. The court may, as part of the
sentencing process, require the corporation to create a detailed "compliance and
ethics program" that "will be "effective in preventing and detecting criminal
conduct."' 15 Sentencing courts can subject a convicted corporation to a probationary
period to monitor its progress in setting up a suitable compliance program. 16 In
addition, the court can require the corporation to create a trust fund sufficient to
address expected future harm,' 7 or to impose on the corporation "community
11. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with
Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at At.
12. BOB LYKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AUDITING AND ITS REGULATORS: REFORMS AFTER
ENRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG. 3 (2002).
13. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 780, n.20 (6th ed. 2008).
14. Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1434, 1457-1458 (2007) (explaining that corporate
cooperation generated by deferred prosecution agreements-in the form of admitting
liability, identifying perpetrators of criminal conduct, and occasionally waiving privileges
to internal documents and investigations-can be invaluable in prosecuting cases against
individuals).
15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2008).
16. Id. § 8D1.4(c).
17. Id. § 8B1.2(b).
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service" that is "reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the offense."' ' 8
Perhaps my favorite authority in this regard is the ability of the court to "order the
organization, at its expense and in the format and media specified by the court, to
publicize the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of
the punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence
of similar offenses."
'1 9
2. The international context
But when we shift to the international context, it is doubtful that conceiving of
collective conduct as "criminal" similarly expands the set of remedies available to
halt and prevent recurrence of the offending conduct. With respect to the first
enhanced benefit of using the criminal law paradigm in the domestic context, there
is no international analogue to ordering the dissolution of a criminal corporation. It
is simply not possible to dissolve or negate the existence of a state, even if it
exhibits system criminality.
Second, there seems to be little hope that identifying the systemic criminality in
a state can be utilized as a tool to facilitate the conviction of individual criminals.
The variety of interested stakeholders and actors with a voice in the governance of
a corporation (including directors, shareholders, and employees) is often more
diverse than is the case for a state, especially a state that exhibits the characteristics
of system criminality. Indeed, I suspect that the designation of a state as criminal,
rather than encouraging the state to aid in securing the conviction of individual
actors in that state, is more likely to foster resistance to criminal prosecution of
individual perpetrators.20
Third, might the enhanced remedies that flow from the use of the criminal
paradigm in the domestic context justify applying the notion of criminality to
systems in the international realm? Professor Nollkaemper has identified
instructive examples of the kinds of structural remedies that can be imagined in
response to the commission of international crimes; 21 this is a real contribution of
his essay. But I question whether it is necessary to think in terms of criminality in
order to avail ourselves of this expanded set of remedies. We have seen the
international system employ remedies going well beyond the traditional forms of
restitution and compensation to address violations of rules of state responsibility
18. Id. § 8B1.3.
19. Id. § 8D1.4(a).
20. 1 explore this notion further in Section III, see infra pp. 361-63.
21. Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 341-43.
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that do not constitute international crimes. In the case of the Iranian nuclear crisis,
for instance, the Security Council has demanded that Iran halt its uranium
enrichment program and accept International Atomic Energy Agency inspections
in accordance with the terms of an Additional Protocol to which Iran is not a
party,22 even though no international crimes have been committed. In the case of
North Korea, the Council has gone perhaps further, obligating North Korea to
"retract its announcement of withdrawal" from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty.23 Security Council Resolution 1540 further demonstrates the broad
capacity of the international system to assert extensive remedial-and even
preventive-powers. It obligates states to "adopt and enforce appropriate effective
laws which prohibit any non-State actor" from acquiring or using weapons of mass
destruction.24
Additionally, the Security Council has conferred extensive regulatory,
governance, and state-building authorities on the many transitional administrative
authorities it has established, beginning with the U.N. Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), the mandate of which included authorities relating to human
rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military
structures, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation
and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the
rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period.25
Two important caveats are important here, at least with respect to the remedies
that can be imposed by the Security Council. First, as Professor Nollkaemper
rightly points out, this broad range of remedial or regulatory capacities is not
available to states acting unilaterally, but depends upon the exercise of the Security
Council's Chapter VII powers. Second, the Council's powers are not available in
all cases, but only where the Council determines that there has been an act of
aggression, a breach of the peace, or a threat to international peace and security.
The key point for my purposes, however, is that the availability of such broad
remedies is not necessarily contingent upon the identification of system criminality
in the target state.
22. S.C. Res. 1737, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006).
23. S.C. Res. 1718, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
24. S.C. Res. 1540, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
25. See S.C. Res. 745, U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (Feb. 28, 1992).
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C. Normative benefits?
Instrumental considerations may not be the only justifications for utilizing the
criminal paradigm to address situations of systemic crimes. As noted above, the
use of the criminal justice sanction, apart from unleashing an expanded
prosecutorial tool kit, is also said to serve the powerful goal of reinforcing societal
norms against the proscribed conduct.
But here, too, I think the value of the criminal paradigm is limited. As Professor
Nollkaemper's essay notes, a feature of system criminality-where the
commission of crimes is pervasive in the system-is that individual crimes are not
seen as violating the norms prevailing in that community; the commission of
crimes is rather seen as being in conformity with the prevailing norms. 26 The
notion of system criminality, however, seems no more likely to alter this situation
than does the state responsibility regime. That is because the relevant normative
discourses-the one taking place within the society in question and the one taking
place in the international community-are being held within different
communities. The affirmation of norms against atrocities through the use of the
criminal sanction is unlikely to change the prevailing normative culture within the
society in question. If it could, what we might characterize as systemic deviance
from global norms would presumably never have emerged in the affected society
in the first place.
Research by the social psychologist Robert Cialdini and others on the role of
social influence on behavior demonstrates not only that individual behavior is
susceptible to outside influence, as Professor Nollkaemper observes, but also that
"an individual occupying a given social space will be more likely to conform to the
attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral propensities exhibited by the local numerical
majority than by either the local numerical minority or less proximate persons."2 7
Because members of more proximate "clusters" reinforce one another's norms,28 it
is unlikely that a social outgroup-like the international community-can serve to
change the beliefs shared by a the local community in a state that exhibits system
criminality.
26. Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 320.
27. Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55
ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 591, 608 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at
613 (noting that individuals subjected to deindividuation procedures "instead conformed
their behaviors to the local, situation-specific norms defined by the group identity").
28. Id. at 608 ("The self-reinforcing nature of clusters tends to perpetuate their existence once
they are formed.").
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So it may be that the only benefit of system criminality is to permit the
international community, for its own benefit, to express its judgment or
condemnation of conduct taking place in mass atrocity situations. But the
international community is already able, as a normative matter, to condemn the
underlying conduct of both individuals (through traditional forms of international
criminal law) and of states (through traditional state responsibility principles). As
such, it is not clear that there is much additional normative benefit associated with
the concept of system criminality. 29
III. Why Not System Criminality? Potential Instrumental Costs
Finally, it may be that not only do we not gain much-either in instrumental or
normative terms-by employing the concept of system criminality; we may actual
produce outcomes that are counterproductive to the goals of halting crimes and
producing changes in local behavior in mass atrocity situations. This is because of
the problematic impact that the international designation of conduct by a state's
actors as "criminal" may have on the societies or groups from which the
perpetrators come-at least if the prevailing domestic reaction to indictments and
prosecutions by international criminal tribunals serves as a guide.
One of the fundamental goals ascribed to criminal prosecutions in the
transitional justice literature is the idea of individualization of guilt.30 Whatever
may be said for the claim that criminalization enables victim groups to distinguish
between the guilty and the innocent among a perpetrator group (or at least between
the very guilty and the less guilty), we observe a quite different dynamic when we
examine the flip side of the individualization of guilt coin. Anecdotal evidence
suggestions that frequently in war crimes situations, members of the groups from
which perpetrators come do not see criminal indictments by international
institutions as a means of identifying the few "bad apples" who happen to come
29. Expression is not the only normative function served by the criminal justice system. It also
addresses a moral and psychological demand for retribution-i.e., for punishment. See
LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 29-30. Even if the psychological demand for retribution can be
satisfied through the punishment of collective enemies-the post-World War I reparations
regime was motivated largely by such a demand for punishment of the German state-I do
not take Professor Nollkaemper's essay to argue for collective punishment. The collective
punishment of states in any event scarcely seems defensible on moral grounds.
30. Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on
the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 737, 766 (1998) (arguing that
criminal justice processes promote interethnic reconciliation through "the individualization
of guilt in hate-mongering leaders and by disabusing people of the myth that adversary
ethnic groups bear collective responsibility for crimes").
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from their community. Rather, the application of the criminal sanction-even
when directed only against individuals-is seen rather as condemnations of their
entire community. For example, Serbs did not see the indictment of Serbian leaders
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as
justifiable charges brought against a few thugs who happened to be Serbs, but
rather as condemnations of the Serb people. 31 By the time he was transferred to
The Hague in 2001, Slobodan Milosevic was no hero to the Serbian people. But
even though the Serbs were themselves eager to prosecute Milosevic for crimes
committed in Serbia,3 2 the ICTY's prosecution of him was seen as an indictment of
Serbia itself.
33
My anecdotal observations of the hostile responses of societies whose nationals
are indicted by international tribunals are consistent with the findings of social
psychology. We may in this regard think of a domestic social order, with its
particular local norms, as an "ingroup," and the international community, with its
universal norms, as an "outgroup." Psychological research shows that when
subjects are exposed to outgroup influences, they "tend to engage in no attitude
change or to move their opinions in the direction opposite of the advocated
position. Given these psychological dynamics, the highly judgmental notion of
system criminality-if it is employed as a tool to devise legal responses in mass
atrocity situations-may increase the extent to which members of a society whose
agents have committed international crimes identify with the perpetrators.
Admittedly, Professor Nollkaemper is careful to note that in his view of system
criminality, "responses targeted at the level of the system... need not carry the
connotation of collective guilt. They can be of a fundamentally different nature
than individual criminal responsibility to which the idea of guilt is inherent."
35
31. See lavor Rangelov, International Law and Local Ideology in Serbia, 16 PEACE REv. 331,
332 (2004) ("In the hearts and minds of many, 'Serbs on trial' [before the ICTY] is
equivalent to 'Serbia on trial,' individual criminal responsibility notwithstanding.").
32. Steven Erlanger, Serb Authorities Arrest Milosevic to End Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2001, § 1, at 1 (describing Milosevic's arrest by Serbian authorities to answer "various
charges of financial irregularities, misusing customs duties, abusing his powers and causing
'damage to the Serbian economy,' including colluding in hyperinflation in the early 1990's
that cost the nation more than $600 million.").
33. Jelena Tosic, Transparent Broadcast? The Reception of Milosovic's Trial in Serbia, in
PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 83, 93 (Marie-
Brndicte Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds.. 2007) (noting a sense of "solidarity or even
identification with" Milosevic during his trial before the ICTY, even on the part of his
former opponents, and a concomitant "counterproductive rise in the popularity of the
former president.").
34. Cialdini & Goldstein, supra note 27, at 612 (citation omitted).
35. Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 325.
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Nevertheless, his project is one that focuses fundamentally on a form of "collective
responsibility, '36 and one that entails stark moral condemnation of social systems
and even entire states. If our ultimate goal is to transform the societies in which
international crimes occur, I fear that the potential backlash of those who are
designated as citizens of states pervaded by systemic criminality will prove far
more harmful than any of the advantages we may realize by highlighting the
systemic nature of international crime.
36. Nollkaemper, supra note 1, at 323, 352.
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